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Informed Consent and the Role of the Treating Physician
Holly Fernandez Lynch, J.D., M.B.E., Steven Joffe, M.D., M.P.H., and Eric A. Feldman, J.D., Ph.D.
In the century since Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo
famously declared that “[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body,”1
informed consent has become a central feature
of American medical practice. In an increasingly
team-based and technology-driven system, however, who is — or ought to be — responsible for
obtaining a patient’s consent? Must the treating
physician personally provide all the necessary
disclosures, or can the consent process, like other
aspects of modern medicine, take advantage of
specialization and division of labor? Analysis of
Shinal v. Toms, a recent Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case, demonstrates the dangers of a narrow,
rigid approach to consent.

Leg al Tr ouble
In 2008, Dr. Steven Toms performed a total
resection of a recurrent craniopharyngioma on
Ms. Megan Shinal. During the procedure, he perforated her carotid artery, which led to permanent severe neurologic injury. Ms. Shinal sued,
claiming that Dr. Toms had failed to explain the
risks of the surgery and that had she known that
a lower-risk subtotal resection was an option,
she would have pursued that alternative instead.2
Dr. Toms testified at trial that during an initial
consultation, he had discussed with Ms. Shinal
her goals and the risks and benefits of total
versus subtotal resection, including the potential
harm that ultimately occurred. Ms. Shinal decided to undergo surgery, but the question of
whether to proceed with total versus subtotal
resection was at that time unresolved.2
Ms. Shinal subsequently spoke with Dr. Toms’s
physician assistant about scarring, the craniotomy incision, potential radiation, and the date for
surgery. Thereafter, she signed a consent form
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that gave Dr. Toms permission to perform “a
resection of recurrent craniopharyngioma” and
that identified the risks of the surgery as including “injury and death,” among others. The form
indicated that Ms. Shinal had discussed the risks
and benefits of alternative treatments, that she had
been given the opportunity to ask questions, and
that she had been given sufficient information
to make her decision. However, the form did not
specifically address the differential risks of the
two surgical options.2
The jury was instructed that when assessing
whether Dr. Toms had satisfied his legal duty to
obtain consent, it could consider information that
had been communicated to Ms. Shinal “by any
qualified person acting as [his] assistant . . . .”
The jury returned a verdict in the doctor’s favor,
which was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. However, in June 2017, a divided
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a different
conclusion. In a 4-to-3 decision, it held that a
physician may not “fulfill through an intermediary the duty to provide sufficient information to
obtain a patient’s informed consent,” such that
the jury instruction at trial had been incorrect.2
In reaching that conclusion, the Shinal majority opinion pointed to Pennsylvania precedent
holding that a hospital has no duty to obtain a
patient’s informed consent, because “only the
physician who performs the operation on the
patient” bears that duty.3 Although that previous
case did not address whether the physician must
personally execute the duty, the Shinal majority
took it to mean that a physician cannot rely on
a subordinate to make requisite consent disclosures.2 In particular, the majority expressed concern about the “primacy of the physician–patient
relationship,” arguing that “[w]ithout direct dialogue and a two-way exchange between physician and patient, the physician cannot be confi-
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dent that the patient comprehends the [necessary
information].”2
The majority opinion also referred to the relevant statutory text in the Pennsylvania Medical
Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE)
Act, which provides that “a physician owes a
duty” to obtain a patient’s informed consent before performing surgery, inserting a surgical device, administering an experimental product or
using an approved product in an experimental
manner, or administering anesthesia, radiation,
chemotherapy, or a blood transfusion.4 On the
basis of this explicit reference to the physician,
the majority held that the plain language of the
statute requires treating physicians to satisfy
their informed-consent duty directly and that
conversations between the patient and others are
irrelevant to satisfaction of the physician’s duty.
With this holding, the court overruled earlier
Pennsylvania cases holding that the validity of
consent does not depend on the identity of the
person making the disclosures.5,6
Elsewhere in the statute, the MCARE Act provides that “[c]onsent is informed if the patient
has been given a description of” the relevant
procedure and its risks and alternatives.4 The
dissenting opinion in Shinal seized on that passive language to argue that the statute does not
specify who must provide patients with the relevant information and that “physicians should
not be needlessly charged with the responsibility
of being involved personally with every conceivable aspect of their practices that may assist
them in informing their patients’ consent.”7
The majority and dissent both agreed that the
treating physician bears the duty to obtain patient consent; the disagreement was about how
this duty may be discharged. Since Shinal, Pennsylvania physicians are legally required to perform
this duty on their own. Because the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is the highest court in the state,
its interpretation of the law is not appealable.
The case has been returned to the lower court
for a new trial under the legal standard set forth
by the majority’s ruling.

half the physicians who responded to a recent
survey conducted by the Pennsylvania Medical Society (PAMED) reported a change in the
informed-consent process in their work setting;
of that group, the vast majority expressed discontent with the effect of the new approach on
patient flow and the way patients are served.8
Medical centers throughout the state have
changed their consent policies, precluding nonphysicians from obtaining patient consent to
the procedures specified in the MCARE Act and
sometimes restricting the involvement of physician trainees. Some Pennsylvania institutions
have also applied the Shinal holding to research,
in light of the reference in the MCARE Act to
experimental products and uses, despite the
clear policy of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) allowing investigators to involve other
staff in the consent process.9,10 The PAMED has
indicated its intention to pursue legislative advocacy in response to the decision,8 but there has
been no legislative action to date.
Although the Shinal decision is not binding
outside of Pennsylvania, cases bearing on critical ethical dimensions of consent have a history
of influence beyond their own jurisdictions.1,11
We believe that Shinal has similar potential,
especially because other state laws also include
language that could be interpreted as requiring
that disclosure be made directly by the treating
provider (Table 1). Attorneys familiar with Ms.
Shinal’s success in Pennsylvania are likely to advance similar arguments in other states, perhaps
successfully.
Even if Shinal is not a harbinger of a national trend, the case invites a broader conversation and careful analysis of unresolved ethical
questions regarding the “who” and “how” of informed consent; these questions have received
substantially less attention than the matter of
“what” must be disclosed and understood. Should
the Pennsylvania legislature allow the Shinal holding to stand? Should other states adopt the
approach delineated by Shinal? We think not.
We believe there are many ways to ensure that
patients have the information and support they
need to make decisions that cohere with their
Implic ations in Penns ylvania
preferences — the ultimate goal of informed
and Be yond
consent — without mandating that treating
Shinal has already had a profound effect in Penn- physicians exercise their consent duty alone,
sylvania, where it represents a substantial depar- absent assistance from other members of the
ture from typical consent practice. More than care team.
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Table 1. Selected State Informed-Consent Laws.
State
Pennsylvania

New York

Oregon

Texas

Wisconsin

Statutory Language

Relevant Case Law

“. . . a physician owes a duty to a patient to
Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical
obtain the informed consent of the patient
Center: Hospitals do not owe
or the patient’s authorized representative
a duty of informed consent,
prior to conducting [various procedures].”4
which is held only by the
“Consent is informed if the patient has been given
treating physician.3
[the required information]. The physician shall Shinal v. Toms: The duty to obtain
be entitled to present evidence of the descrip
patient consent may be per
tion of that procedure and those risks and alter
formed only by the treating
natives that a physician acting in accordance
physician.2
with accepted medical standards of medical
practice would provide.”4
“Lack of informed consent means the failure of
Hoffson v. Orentreich11: The stat
the person providing the professional treat
ute does not expressly pre
ment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient
clude use of an agent to pro
such alternatives thereto and the reasonably
vide information to a patient
foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a
on behalf of the treating pro
reasonable medical, dental or podiatric prac
vider (relying on a pre-Shinal
titioner under similar circumstances would
Pennsylvania case5).
have disclosed, in a manner permitting the
patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.”12
“In order to obtain the informed consent of a pa No relevant case law identified.
tient, a physician or physician assistant shall
explain the following: (a) In general terms the
procedure or treatment to be undertaken; (b)
That there may be alternative procedures or
methods of treatment, if any; and (c) That there
are risks, if any, to the procedure or treatment.”13
“After giving the [initial explanation], the physician
or physician assistant shall ask the patient if
the patient wants a more detailed explanation.
If the patient requests further explanation, the
physician or physician assistant shall disclose
in substantial detail the procedure, the viable
alternatives and the material risks unless to do so
would be materially detrimental to the patient.”13
“. . . the physician or health care provider shall Vaughan v. Nielson15: The physi
disclose to the patient or person authorized
cian is responsible for the
to consent for the patient the risks and hazards
“propriety” of the form, but
involved . . . .”14
Texas cases have “consis
“Health care provider” includes any person or in
tently held” that nothing in
stitution licensed to provide health care in the
the statute requires a physi
state.14
cian to personally promulgate
Statutory requirements are satisfied if consent is
that form.
given in writing, signed by the patient or autho
rized representative, and “the written consent
specifically states the risks and hazards.”14

“Any physician who treats a patient shall inform
the patient about the availability of reason
able alternate medical modes of treatment
and about the benefits and risks of these
treatments.”16

n engl j med 378;25

Brooks v. Physicians Insurance
Company of Wisconsin, Inc.17:
The obligation to obtain con
sent lies with the physician.
Here, the physician discussed
the relevant procedures with
the patient. The law does not
require the physician to direct
ly obtain the patient’s signa
ture on the consent form.
Rubedor v. Kopp18: At trial, permit
ting a jury instruction that the
treating physician may “dele
gate to another physician the
informed consent process,” but
must verify adequate disclosure.
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Analysis
The statutory language clearly recog
nizes the physician’s duty but is
ambiguous as to whether the physi
cian must directly disclose the rele
vant consent information. The Valles
case did not specify how the physi
cian’s consent duty must be dis
charged. Both the Shinal majority
and dissent interpretations of the
statutory text are plausible.
The New York statutory language could
be viewed as more stringent than
the Pennsylvania statute, because
it directly references who is to dis
close the relevant consent informa
tion. However, in Hoffson, a New
York court (not the highest court in
the state) interpreted the law flexibly
to allow disclosure by others.
The Oregon statute specifically refer
ences physician assistants, which
could make it more permissive than
the reference only to physicians in
the Pennsylvania statute. However,
it is unclear whether the intent is to
allow physician assistants to perform
consent tasks on behalf of physicians
in general or only when the physician
assistant is performing a medical
service directly for a patient.

Intermediate appellate courts in Texas
have interpreted this statute flexibly
to date, and the language may be
more permissive than that for Pennsyl
vania, given the specific mention of
other health care providers and the
emphasis on written consent mate
rials. However, mention of other
health care providers could be inter
preted as relevant only when there
is no physician involved (e.g., for den
tal or chiropractic care) or in reference
to institutional consent obligations.
Like the New York statute, this statute
explicitly refers to disclosures by the
treating physician, which is more
stringent than the Pennsylvania
statute. Relevant case law (although
not from the highest court in the
state) has permitted some flexibility,
noting that disclosure by the treat
ing physician is adequate to satisfy
the duty even if someone else ob
tains the patient’s signature. At
least one trial court has permitted
disclosure by someone other than
the treating physician.

2435

The

n e w e ng l a n d j o u r na l

of

m e dic i n e

Pr omoting High - Qualit y Informed physician assistants, nurses, and others — often
Consent thr ough Te amwork
possess the skills and characteristics needed to
conduct or enhance a high-quality discussion of
Achieving high-quality informed consent is com- consent.26 Accordingly, we believe it is ethically
plex.19 It requires patients who have the capacity acceptable, and ought to be legally permissible,
to make the relevant decisions and circumstances to allow treating physicians to rely on these
that facilitate voluntary choice. It also requires team members for help in performing their conadequate disclosure of material information to sent duties. For example, the treating physician
patients, as well as their comprehension of that could describe the patient’s options at a high
information and an ability to fit it into the level and make a preliminary recommendation
larger context of their lives and goals.20 To for an appropriate course of treatment. A qualiachieve these ends, health professionals seeking fied professional under the physician’s superviconsent must have sufficient expertise, judgment, sion could then educate the patient further about
and training to know what to disclose and how the risks and benefits of relevant alternatives,
to respond to questions.19 Strong communica- with substantial attention to eliciting the patient’s
tion skills are critical, as is adequate time.19 In a values and goals. Finally, the treating physician
Department of Veterans Affairs study of 575 could rejoin this ongoing process to address any
patients scheduled for elective surgeries, 60% of remaining questions and uncertainties, assisting
consent conversations took 10 minutes or more, the patient in confirming a final decision.20 We
and shorter conversations were associated with suspect that the patient would probably emerge
a substantial decrement in patient comprehen- from this process more informed and would
sion.21 However, the National Ambulatory Medi- make a decision with more confidence than
cal Care Survey showed that, in 2015, patients would have been possible after a short office visit
spent 15 minutes or less with the physician at with the treating physician. Indeed, although the
43% of office visits and spent 16 to 30 minutes Shinal majority expressed concern that allowing
with the physician at 42% of visits,22 during physicians to “delegate the provision of critical
which time a variety of activities had to be ac- information to staff” could “undermine patient
complished. Time is also relevant in the sense autonomy and bodily integrity by depriving the
that leading consent discussions is a skill that patient of the opportunity to engage in a dialogue
must be practiced and perfected — it is not with his or her chosen health care provider,”2 the
automatically bestowed on newly minted physi- approach suggested here would offer the patient
cians.23
support in reaching the best decision.
Consider that at present, “physicians and patients rarely achieve the theoretical ideal”19 when Maintaining a Nondeleg a ble D u t y
it comes to informed consent, “physician-led
informed consent discussions are often ill-timed Although we argue that the treating physician
or ineffective,”24 and in outpatient practice, few may ethically seek the assistance of others in
patient decisions are adequately informed.25 Per- performing the tasks involved in obtaining conhaps with more time physicians would do better, sent, delegating those tasks does not necessarily
but this could result in longer wait times, more entail delegating ultimate responsibility. The
difficulty securing appointments, and higher tasks may be shared, but we maintain that the
costs.7,8 From the patient’s perspective, physi- responsibility for achieving the goal of consent
cians’ time may be better spent on those special- — an informed decision that accords with the
ized tasks that only they have the skill to per- patient’s values and priorities — belongs to the
form, while other members of the team treating physician alone.
participate in the consent process as they do in
To understand this distinction, consider two
other clinical tasks for which they are appropri- approaches to informed consent: “passing the
ately trained and supervised. This is not to sug- buck” versus “the buck stops here.” In the forgest that we place efficiency above the quality of mer, the treating physician is permitted to fully
consent in terms of importance or priority; in- delegate the responsibility to obtain informed
stead, we maintain that both goals can be consent to others, so that if something goes
wrong, the person to whom the duty was deleachieved simultaneously.
Other members of the care team — including gated is held responsible. In the latter, the treat2436
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ing physician cannot delegate the responsibility
— only the tasks. If the person to whom the
tasks are delegated fails, the treating physician
remains responsible. Which approach is pref
erable?
If the buck is passed in the sense that the
consent duty itself is transferred from the treating physician to others, there is a risk that responsibility will be diffused, leading to confusion,
error, and potentially conflicting information.27
Just as it is important to have a single party who
is responsible for coordinating a patient’s care
when various competent specialists are involved,
it seems important to have someone who is ultimately responsible for the informed consent
process — someone who oversees the process
and is held accountable for failures. Moreover,
imposing liability on the treating physician
should help ensure that patients’ needs are satisfied and their rights to autonomy protected,
because it provides incentives for both the establishment of good consent practices and appropriate oversight in individual cases. We argue
that if others who have been tapped to take part
in the consent process do a sufficient job, the
treating physician’s duty should be deemed satisfied, even if the treating physician merely assigned the relevant tasks. However, we maintain
that if those with whom the treating physician
shares the tasks involved in obtaining consent
perform inadequately, the buck should stop with
the treating physician. This is precisely the approach advocated by the Shinal dissent, which
argued that “[i]f qualified staff is somehow
negligent in aiding a physician in informing a
patient’s consent, then the physician remains
liable . . . .”7
There is one legal caveat: in most states (although not Pennsylvania),3 a physician’s institution also may be liable for failures to obtain informed consent, in addition to or instead of the
physician. But the important point here is that,
in our view, the buck should never be passed
down from the treating physician to supporting
staff.

ing the benefits to the patient and the gains in
efficiency associated with relying on others. Instead, we propose that treating physicians should
do two things. First, we suggest that they establish the right structures to support those with
whom they plan to share the tasks involved in
consent. Do the supporting actors have the
training, expertise, tools, and time necessary to
perform their portion of the consent process?
Do they know what is expected of them? The
treating physician may wish to audit the process
periodically, but assuming all is in order, we
argue the physician should feel confident that
the duty to secure consent is being adequately
discharged. Second, we suggest that the treating
physician should, before performing the procedure in question, speak with the patient to confirm that consent discussions have indeed taken
place with the appropriate people, that all questions have been answered, and that the patient
is secure in the ultimate treatment decision. We
are not proposing elimination of “direct dialogue” or “two-way exchange between the physician and patient,” as the Shinal majority feared2;
there is a middle ground between permitting
abdication of physician engagement and refusing in a court of law to consider information
provided to a patient by anyone other than the
treating physician.
In our view, the insistence of the Shinal majority that the treating physician personally provide
all consent-related disclosures is an anachronism
in a team-based health care system.7 Allowing
the tasks involved in consent to be shared with
qualified professionals, while holding the treating physician responsible for achieving the goals
of consent, should facilitate informed decision
making by the patient while enabling physicians
to preserve time for other clinical functions that
only they can perform. We expect that such an
approach will redound to the benefit of all patients.
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Despite the understandable impulse to avoid
litigation, we believe it is a mistake to allow the
consent process to be shaped by fear of liability,7
encouraging repetition of shared tasks just to be
on the “safe side.” This approach risks eliminat-
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